He would have been better off not talking about harm directly but the ability to cause harm; he actually used that wording in an earlier comment in this chain. (Basically strawmanned himself lol.)

Because as a standalone argument for encryption, it's fairly sound – hey, the ability of somebody to cause harm via encrypted messaging channels is the selfsame ability to do good [/prevent spying/protect privacy, whistleblowers/etc], and since the good outweighs the bad, we have to protect the ability to cause harm (sadly).

The problem is it's still disanalogous – the ability to cause harm via LLM use is not the selfsame ability to do good (or to do otherwise what you want). My LLM's refusing to tell me how to make a bomb has no impact on its ability to tell me how to make a pasta bake.

Define harm.

We don't believe that at all, we believe privacy is a human right. Also you're just objectively wrong about LLMs. Offline uncensored LLMs already exist, and will perpetually exist. We don't defend tools doing harm, we acknowledge it.

You realise that most encryption can be decrypted by third-party? Many cryptography libraries have huge flaws, even the Handbook of Applied Cryptography was encouraging using Damgard et al's parameters for prime selection even though the original authors never claimed the accuracy that others assumed (without basis). Even now, can you guess how many cryptography libraries would be broken if someone found a BPSW pseudoprime? And we have arguments that they probably exist, but crypto developers just ignore it either out of ignorance or laziness.

In summary, it's all theatre, you just want to deny access to enough parties that it makes you comfortable.