I can't imagine any messenger is private if you invite random people into a group chat 🤦♂️
Privacy
A place to discuss privacy and freedom in the digital world.
Privacy has become a very important issue in modern society, with companies and governments constantly abusing their power, more and more people are waking up to the importance of digital privacy.
In this community everyone is welcome to post links and discuss topics related to privacy.
Some Rules
- Posting a link to a website containing tracking isn't great, if contents of the website are behind a paywall maybe copy them into the post
- Don't promote proprietary software
- Try to keep things on topic
- If you have a question, please try searching for previous discussions, maybe it has already been answered
- Reposts are fine, but should have at least a couple of weeks in between so that the post can reach a new audience
- Be nice :)
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much thanks to @gary_host_laptop for the logo design :)
Layer 8 security issue
error: problem between keyboard and chair
but nowadays maybe it works better with screen
PEBCAK Problem Exists Between Chair And Keyboard!
Knew of an IT help desk employee who used this as a resolution in a ticket. Yeah, he got fired as soon as the customer looked up what it meant.
Also known verbally as an "I. D. Ten T." error (id10t error).
The actual military grade (xmpp based) messengers implement security lables, meaning messages are tagged with the required security clearance and if you invite random people to a chat they can't see the messages.
The exact reason why it's bad for top secret communications is why individuals should use it or something like it. That is government auditability.
What kind of private communication can we talk about if you must have a valid phone number to use Signal?! Lol
Signal recently implemented "usernames" instead of phone numbers
But still, to use it, you need a phone number, which in many countries can only be purchased with a passport. That's the main rule. If privacy is really needed, personal identification should be excluded so that it's basically impossible to determine who owns the account.
Pretty sure you still need a phone number for an account, though - the usernames are just for sharing your contact with other people.
Most peoples' phone numbers are easily linked to their identity. Which means the government knows who's using Signal.
Usernames are definitely an improvement, but this is a fundamental limitation in Signal's design.
Privacy != anonymous
No, but it's easy enough to be both. There's a pile of IM packages out there that manage it.
Metadata is valuable info, look at what a pen register nets law enforcement and why it's the first step in an investigation. The idea that a messaging app that's supposed to be used for political action but the chain of association is visible and verified is absolutely suspect.
You say "easy enough" but there are some serious tradeoffs when removing phone numbers from the equation. My mom can use Signal without my help but she wouldn't be able to use SimpleX.
Signal is a fantastic middle ground messaging app that is secure enough for me to use and easy enough for my mom to use.
I also have SimpleX but I have exactly 1 contact there...
Wherever Signal is mentioned, I shall mention SimpleX-Chat.
Zero user ID needed to use. No phone numbers and no username.
SimpleX-Chat!!!
Out of band key exchange is great -as long as people can physically meet and exchange QR codes. In reality, they are often sent via less secure means. As always, the humans are the weakest security link.
Fair point, it always feels dirty to send invite-link through WhatsApp, the dominant messenger in EU.
How would one go to solve the invite problem? How does Signal handle this?
Phone number and trust-on-first-use for most people, with out-of-band fingerprint verification for the paranoid. It really depends on the threat model and the security practices/awareness of your colleagues, but a link shared on some social media or lower-security chat network is more vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack than a phone number for your average Joe. There are a lot of ways a person could get a manipulated invite link.
Finally someone who understands! Haven't found anything better. Just missing the bridging bit, though that comprises the privacy/security and overall personal opinion why I started using SimpleX.
UI-wise it isn't there yet, but actively being developed so. I miss posting photos (combined) with a comment, now they are all sent separately.
Anyhow if you are looking for privacy go for SimpleX!
SimpleX is kinda good, but also we have briar, it does have ids, but more secure and 2P2, i don't know if simpleX was checked by third parties about security, briar was audited by cure53 for example.
I personally use carrier pigeons with caesar cipher. I know I can't out tech google, so I will go medieval.
Consider Briar.
Uses Tor. Works directly over Bluetooth/WiFi if the internet is censored or shut down. Decentralized, no accounts. No phone number required.
Of all the options available, I feel like this one is the best suited to current threats (oppressive governments with all-encompassing surveillance, and the willingness to destroy critical institutions and infrastructure).
The app is super barebones right now - feels like SMS - but it works. Main downside is that both participants have to be online at the same time (maybe group chats can work around this?), since there's no servers.
How does the Bluetooth work? If you're close enough to be in bluetooth range with someone aren't you close enough to just speak to them?
One use case could be mass protests/uprisings, where you have a lot of people congregated in a small area. An increasingly popular strategy among governments these days is to just shut down the entire internet in an agitated region. Bluetooth could keep information flowing between people with only mutual contacts, as they move in and out of range.
I'll have to give this a look. Since going to music festivals where I couldn't text my friends I've wanted a decentralized adhoc network message app. Using pgp all messages bounces through all devices within local device network range but you can only read the ones you have private keys for.
Signal is great, that's why I'm suspicious that this recent story is to not only target journalism, but also secure app communication. I wouldn't be surprised if it's used as an excuse to remove signal from the app stores.
Hopefully I'm just being too paranoid.
Immediately had that thought as well.
Don't blame the barn for not holding the horses when you leave the fucking door open.
I don’t think that’s the case, I just think it is old people not know how to use technology.
Additionally, all these people in power are using signal, how is that not a loud endorsement that everyone should be on it.
Sadly, my contact list remains mostly on WhatsApp and Facebook messenger only.
Anyone who uses Facebook messenger as their only messenging app will need to text or call me. Fuck that. I do, however, use WhatsApp and discord for work and uni group chats. If or when that's no longer the case, people who only use those will need to text me, too.
Regarding the trick of an adversary gaining access by emailing or SMS'ing a QR code for adding another device...
Why does the new device not demand the PIN before being added?
It does, I tried it. Though, that may have been an addition since the attacks started.
Though, in that specific case - Russian agents conducting espionage via targeted individuals - it's very likely they surveil their targets long enough to catch their device PIN before they nab the phone and return it. In the end, there is very little recourse to defend against this type of Evil Maid attack. Signal is really better at protecting against mass surveillance, but for individuals directly targeted by state espionage? You would need serious opsec, using air-gapped computers kept in safes or guarded by humans 24x7 and other crazy stuff. They have rules about what can be physically done with devices containing top secret information for a good reason.