this post was submitted on 07 Jun 2024
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Even though that's a good extra precaution, per person config data, such as keys, should be stored outside of the repo, eg. in the parent directory or better in the users home dir. There is zero reason to have it in the repo. Even if you use a VM/containers, you can add the config in an extra mount/share.
What's the general consensus on storing encrypted data in the repo with the keys outside? I see people recommend that but I'm too paranoid and my secrets are very small in size so it hasn't been necessary.
the format of the encrypted file can give the attackers an advantage. if your code reads the decrypted file, the attacker can guess the first line is a comment or the name of a setting. a savvy person can combine that with the algorithm to perform a "known plaintext attack", for example by generating a number of possible passwords that would lead to files starting like that.
That's smart. Anyone trying that should definitely have a machine-generated strong password!
That's not quite the definition of known plaintext attack (cryptography nerd here), that's bruteforce with a "crib" to use older terminology (known patterns which allows you to test candidate keys).
A known plaintext attack is defined as an attack on the algorithm to extract the key faster than bruteforce with analytical attacks.
I've seen that done for configuration management like Salt or Ansible. The repos for that were always hosted on internal Gitlab instances though.
I see some of that in my job. We put encrypted data in settings files, and the keys for decryption are provided on the VMs where we deploy. The developers never actually see the keys.
I suppose it's as secure as the process for managing the production VMs, assuming the encryption isn't just md5!