this post was submitted on 06 May 2024
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Let's also not forget that there was no way to exit the submersible from the inside. The door was bolted on by the surface team. So if they had just lost power (instead of being crushed), they would've been floating on the surface with no way out. That's the another obvious horrendous design choice.
I have worked in underground mines, and this scenario of being bolted inside gives me way more cluster phobia than any experience I have had
I work on submarines. Everything that company was doing gave me a panic attack. The SUBSAFE program exists for a reason. Like, there's a time and place for innovation, and when people's lives are on the line is NOT it.
Usually these program's rules seem very tedious and restrictive and I can easily see one person looking at this and think they are in place to stifle innovation and keep the little guy out.
I remember how he said to not have regulatory approval because of of this or that, but why not get a regulatory expert to have a look, might not approve your vessel but might show clearly missed safety critical blindspots.
But these rules exist for a reason, they where usually written in blood, it's how I know this incident added rules to your SUBSAFE program.
SUBSAFE was implemented in 1963 following the loss of USS Thresher (SSN-593). It's a remarkably strict QA program for systems and components exposed to seawater/operating pressure. To our credit, we've only lost one submarine since 1963 (USS Scorpion, SSN-589, and she was never SUBSAFE-certified), so the program works.
Similarly stringent controls for the Titan would have either caught all the manufacturing defects in the carbon fiber, or prevented anyone from thinking it's a good idea to begin with. A big part of innovation is learning what rules you can reasonably bend/break, and which should never be touched. I tend to think pressure hull construction falls in the "never touch" category, at least not without a mountain of testing, data collection, fatigue life calculation, etc. along with communication with regulatory bodies to ensure you meet the principles of the regulation, if not the exact words (again, innovation has it's place).
So cool you work on submarines that is extremely cool, I am in a way different industry, mining. Jeez I wished we had your safety record of only one lost submarine. Our industry has gone through a couple of mines in the same period.
But wow, how does the safety of submarines compare to other industries, granted outside of war times, like compared to trains or even other seafaring vessels
We benefit from the bottomless DoD budget for sure. We have the ability to spend as much as it takes on material and training to ensure reliability and safety for the crew. And it shows. We've had several undersea collisions (SSN-711 in 2005 and SSN-22 in 2021), and while both incidents were extremely serious, both boats made it safely back to port for repair.
Claustrophobia?
There's how you spell the word