Technology

Both of you are right.

It's difficult, but how difficult depends on the task you set. If the task is "maintain manually initiated target lock on a clearly defined object on an empty field, despite the communications link breaking for 10 seconds" -> it is "give a team of coders half a year" difficult. It's been solved before, the solution just needs re-inventing and porting to a different platform.

If it's "identify whether an object is military, whether it is frienly or hostile, consider if it's worth attacking, and attack a camouflaged target in a dense forest", then it's currently not worth trying.

Realtime person detection and following it with a drone? Difficult for me, certainly, but there are enough people out there who have done it.

It's one thing detecting a person with machine learning in a test and an actual soldier with camouflage in a very imperfect environment. Also good luck telling friend from foe from civilian.

This has all sorts of problems while making the whole system more complicated and prone to issues. Not the mention moral questions of autonomous weapons. I have no doubt it will happen but not yet, not here.

Between GPS (jammable but likely gets you into the target area), dead reckoning, optical flow sensors and increasingly impressive onboard camera processing, RF jamming will soon be irrelevant.

Almost a decade ago I was flying agricultural mapping missions that were 99% autonomous, and the parts that weren't were problems a military drone doesn't have (soft launch and landing)

The clear counter is autocannons, likely fully automated themselves to manage large swarms. The other would be cheap anti-drone missiles that either are basically a drone themselves or a glorified model rocket. Possibly tiny, cheap and fast interceptors launched from fixed-wing drones. The weak point of drones is literally their physical weakness.

It's worth noting we are at the start of an arms race. It will iterate all over the place.

For example, smoke and chaff deploying drones would make defensive fire harder. Anti air can be either baited (and so depleted) or rushed. Lasers can be shielded against, at least for a time. Jamming can be countered with line of site communications.

In turn, each of these can be countered.

A key thing of note is that your solutions are heavy. Fine for defending a static target, but problematic when dealing with defending a mobile unit etc infantry of transports. In those situations an extremely rapid, focused highly dynamic response would be required. The obvious way to deploy those fast enough is to have them automated and airborne, aka a drone swarm.

I might be completely wrong, current drone warfare is akin to the invention of the smoothbore musket. How it will develop remains to be seen (for better or for worse).

They may both have a role.

If you know that a given point is at risk of attack, using a static defense like AA guns is practical. Say you have some sort of specific, high-value target that you can put AA guns around. That may be a very sensible thing to do.

But the problem, if you intend to rely only on those, is that there is then a concentration of force issue. The attacker can choose which point to attack; they get the initiative.

Say you're trying to defend against something like a Shahed-136. It can hit pretty much anywhere in Ukraine. You can't stick an AA gun on everything that Russia might consider trading a Shahed-136 for.

But, okay, say you try to go big with static defenses. Let's say that you can obtain and pony up the resources to hypothetically stick an AA gun at every single point along the front line and border, and that your AA gun has the altitude to hit a drone. You have an unbroken line of engagement envelope all around a country. That'd be an extraordinary expenditure, but it could hypothetically be done. So a drone has to fly through defended airspace. The problem is that if the other guy expends an equivalent amount of resources, he can buy a shit-ton of drones and fly them all through a single gun's engagement envelope. Even if he doesn't even bother to try to attack the antiaircraft gun, your gun defenses are just going to get overwhelmed, because all of the attacker's resources are engaged, whereas the vast bulk of the defender's resources are not in the fight. Maybe you hit a tiny percentage of drones, but the rest are going to be able to simply fly through.

The problem is that the cost of static defenses in that scenario grows at something like the square of the scale of the air conflict -- you have to have enough static defenses to counter all of the attacker's aircraft, and pre-place those defenses at all points that might be attacked, whereas the cost of the attack grows only linearly. It's cost-effective to use static defenses only if the attacker is compelled to attack a limited number of points.

If that's not the case, then using some form of mobile defense is more important -- say, I don't know, you have a fleet of gun-armed, jet-powered counter-UAS UASes. Dollar-for-dollar, they might not be as effective as a static gun. But...you can route most or all of them in to meet any given attack.

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!

-- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ~400 BC

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I suspect it will be more subtle even if it's only battery life limited. Huge swarms will also struggle against fixed defences. More likely it will be used in ambush. E.g. air deployed near an enemy convoy, or swarming from rooftops and windows onto an infantry unit. Counter deployment will have to be seconds to stop the lead elements. Potentially with heavier reinforcements flying in.

I've personally got visions of a Boston dynamics dogbot with a harness full of drones. 1 button press and a few dozen micro drones swarm out, with larger ones launching as needed.

I could also see facial recognition drones being deployed from a predator drone, like cluster bombs. A little akin to the bots used in the film minority report. They swarm a building or block, and try and identify all the faces they can find.

The key thing however will be battery life. Multicopters are power hogs. You need around 40% battery to get maybe 5-20 minutes flight times (depending on how the manoeuvre). Longer times can be achieved , but requires larger systems with higher costs. Is 1 system with a 2 hour flight time worth 20 smaller systems only good for 10 minutes?