This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of "illusion" created by the mammalian brain (I've also seen people describe it as an "internal simulation"), called "consciousness" or sometimes "subjective experience" with the adjective "subjective" used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.
If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then "true" reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow "gives rise to" this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the "hard problem of consciousness" is a self-described dualist.
This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist's contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli's weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov's empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and "true" reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of "consciousness" and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience "subjective."
The "hard problem" and the "mind-body problem" are the main reasons I consider myself a direct realist. I find that it is a completely insoluble contradiction at the heart of metaphysical realism, I don't think it even can be solved because you cannot posit a fundamental gap and then mend the gap later without contradicting yourself. There has to be no gap from the get-go. I see these "problems" as not things to be "solved," but just a proof-by-contradiction that metaphysical realism is incorrect. All the arguments against direct realism, on the other hand, are very weak and people who espouse them don't seem to give them much thought.
This problem presupposes metaphysical realism, so you have to be a metaphysical realist to take the problem seriously. Metaphysical realism is a particular kind of indirect realism whereby you posit that everything we observe is in some sense not real, sometimes likened to a kind of "illusion" created by the mammalian brain (I've also seen people describe it as an "internal simulation"), called "consciousness" or sometimes "subjective experience" with the adjective "subjective" used to make it clear it is being interpreted as something unique to conscious subjects and not ontologically real.
If everything we observe is in some sense not reality, then "true" reality must by definition be independent of what we observe. If this is the case, then it opens up a whole bunch of confusing philosophical problems, as it would logically mean the entire universe is invisible/unobservable/nonexperiential, except in the precise configuration of matter in the human brain which somehow "gives rise to" this property of visibility/observability/experience. It seems difficult to explain this without just presupposing this property arbitrarily attaches itself to brains in a particular configuration, i.e. to treat it as strongly emergent, which is effectively just dualism, indeed the founder of the "hard problem of consciousness" is a self-described dualist.
This philosophical problem does not exist in direct realist schools of philosophy, however, such as Jocelyn Benoist's contextual realism, Carlo Rovelli's weak realism, or in Alexander Bogdanov's empiriomonism. It is solely a philosophical problem for metaphysical realists, because they begin by positing that there exists some fundamental gap between what we observe and "true" reality, then later have to figure out how to mend the gap. Direct realist philosophies never posit this gap in the first place and treat reality as precisely equivalent to what we observe it to be, so it simply does not posit the existence of "consciousness" and it would seem odd in a direct realist standpoint to even call experience "subjective."
The "hard problem" and the "mind-body problem" are the main reasons I consider myself a direct realist. I find that it is a completely insoluble contradiction at the heart of metaphysical realism, I don't think it even can be solved because you cannot posit a fundamental gap and then mend the gap later without contradicting yourself. There has to be no gap from the get-go. I see these "problems" as not things to be "solved," but just a proof-by-contradiction that metaphysical realism is incorrect. All the arguments against direct realism, on the other hand, are very weak and people who espouse them don't seem to give them much thought.