Microblog Memes

Political context courtesy of the Arab Center in Washington DC:

TL;DR: The Houthis are backed by Iran, in direct regional competition to Saudi Arabian (and subsequently US) interests, and the war in Yemen is a direct result of 10 years worth of failed intervention by the Saudis.

Excerpt:

Exactly a decade ago, Saudi Arabia announced the launch of a military intervention in Yemen, promising to lead a coalition of more than 10 nations—although some would later end their participation—against the Houthi armed group, officially known as Ansar Allah, that had taken over power from President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Backed by the United States, Britain, and other Western states with arms and shared intelligence, on March 26, 2015, the Saudi coalition commenced airstrikes on Houthi-controlled areas, initiating a conflict that would drag on for years. Riyadh’s initial expectation of a swift, six-week military operation to defeat the Houthis became a prolonged and costly entanglement that has tested Saudi Arabia’s ability to impose its will on its neighbor and to force the Houthis to give up their control over a large part of Yemen. Intervention Inception

Saudi Arabia’s rationale for intervention shifted over time as the conflict unfolded. At the outset, it cast the intervention as a direct response to President Hadi’s urgent appeal to the Gulf states and their international allies that he conveyed in a letter to the UN Security Council in March 2015. Hadi called for states “to provide immediate support in every form and take the necessary measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the ongoing Houthi aggression.” The Saudis initially conceived of the intervention as a decisive effort to reinstate Yemen’s legitimate government in the capital Sanaa. As the situation progressed, Saudi Arabia reframed its objective as restoring Yemen’s political process within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, which in 2011-2012 facilitated the transfer of power from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to Hadi.

The core rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s intervention, however, stemmed from its perception of the Houthis as an Iranian proxy on the kingdom’s border. Riyadh feared that Iran’s influence through the Houthis posed a direct threat to the kingdom’s regional dominance and interests. The kingdom saw the Houthi takeover of Sanaa not just as a challenge to Yemen’s stability but as a potential game changer in the broader Middle East power dynamics. In this context, Saudi Arabia framed its military intervention as a necessary response to protect its own security and regional influence.

Riyadh feared that the Houthis posed a direct threat to the kingdom’s regional dominance and interests.

But while Saudi Arabia believed Iran to be the principal force behind the Houthi takeover, the extent of Iranian influence over the group at the time was, in fact, relatively limited. Although the Houthis depended on Iranian military and logistical support, particularly for weaponry and strategic advice, they were not fully under Iran’s control. Iran, while capable of advising the Houthis on strategic and policy matters, lacked the leverage to dictate their actions. Rather, local factors such as longstanding tribal rivalries in Yemen, the Houthis’ longtime opposition to the central government, and their pursuit of greater political power, were more influential in shaping the Houthis’ behavior. The Houthi alliances with former President Saleh and certain factions of the Yemeni military also played a crucial role in the group’s rise. In other words, Iran’s influence was significant, but it was not all-encompassing, as the Houthis had their own political and strategic goals. Nonetheless, Riyadh persisted in portraying the Houthis as a tool of Iranian expansionism. Paradoxically, Saudi Arabia’s prolonged antagonism may have ultimately strengthened Iran’s influence, as it pushed the Houthi armed group to deepen its reliance on Iranian military and logistical support.