TechSploits

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All things relating to breaking tech, tech breaking, OSS, or hacking together software to perform something completely out of the ordinary, on purpose or by accident.

founded 1 year ago
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Unbelievable...

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Drew always has a hot take about a problem

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The PoC thickens

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UEFI IRC, the perfect companion to asking why your Linux boot partition no longer exists #joke

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Now that is a Gaming Router

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submitted 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago) by [email protected] to c/[email protected]
 
 

Video link for those on clients who don't show links when they are videos: https://i.imgur.com/5jtvxPQ.mp4

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Practical attacks with a Raspberry Pi.

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An interesting talk

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Visualizing ext4 (buredoranna.github.io)
submitted 10 months ago by [email protected] to c/[email protected]
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submitted 10 months ago* (last edited 10 months ago) by [email protected] to c/[email protected]
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Pretty scary stuff in here

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Abstract

Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) promises an isolated execution environment, protected from all software running on the machine. As such, numerous works have sought to leverage SGX to provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees for code running in adversarial environments. In the past few years however, SGX has come under heavy fire, threatened by numerous hardware attacks. With Intel repeatedly patching SGX to regain security while consistently launching new (micro)architectures, it is increasingly difficult to track the applicability of various attacks techniques across the SGX design landscape. Thus, in this paper we set out to survey and categorize various SGX attacks, their applicability to different SGX architectures, as well as the information leaked by them. We then set out to explore the effectiveness of SGX’s update mechanisms in preventing attacks on real-world deployments. Here, we study two commercial SGX applications. First, we investigate the SECRET network, an SGX-backed blockchain aiming to provide privacy preserving smart contracts. Next, we also consider PowerDVD, a UHD Blu-Ray Digital Rights Management (DRM) software licensed to play discs on PCs. We show that in both cases vendors are unable to meet security goals originally envisioned for their products, presumably due to SGX’s long update timelines and the complexities of a manual update process. This in turn forces vendors into mak- ing difficult security/usability trade offs, resulting in security compromises.


A worthwhile read for those who don't mind a more technical paper

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